Significant responsibility amidst robust providence: A defense of Reformed Molinism as a rapprochement between divine election and metaphysical human freedom

This dissertation introduces the theological position of Reformed Molinism. It defines Reformed Molinism as holding to the following claims:;G    God exhibits robust providence.;H    All mere humans possess significant responsibility.;S    God endows irresistible grace to believers he has chosen.;A defense is offered as to how these three claims may be understood to comprise a consistent set.;Chapter 1 introduces the scope of the project, defines the relevant terms and explains why one might believe the above claims to be inconsistent with one another.;Chapter 2 puts forward the idea of significant human responsibility, arguing that in order for humans to have significant human freedom they must possess, at least, some incompatibilist human freedom. I argue why compatibilist human freedom fails to offer significant responsibility and explain that humans can be understood to possess incompatibilist and non-incompatibilist human freedom.;Chapter 3 argues that only a view of providence which affords God robust providence---containing exhaustive foreknowledge and sovereign control---accords with scripture and orthodox tradition. I demonstrate that the Molinist's version of providence offers such a robust providence and that the Molinist's doctrine of divine middle knowledge accommodates significant human responsibility and divine providence. I defend Molinism from various opposing arguments.;Chapter 4 contains a defense of Reformed Molinism. I put forward a proposition together with H that entails G. I also argue for a proposition together with H that entails S. In so doing, I contend that the Reformed Molinist is consistent to hold G, H, and S.;By way of conclusion, I seek to show how Reformed Molinism accords with certain components of Christian theology and how it might offer advantages in terms of explaining various theological questions.