Continuity and change in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy: A critical analysis

The study of US nonproliferation policy has traditionally focused on characteristics of the proliferator to explain variations in the preferred US policy outcome: no new nuclear weapons states. Failures in achieving this goal have most often been attributed to the "roguishness" of the proliferating state, its desire for the international prestige normally associated with achieving nuclear weapon status, or intense security concerns which override its desire or ability to adhere to international and US rules governing nuclear proliferation. The argument being forwarded here is that variations within US nonproliferation policy have been the greatest influence on the attainment of US goals, not necessarily the actions of the proliferators themselves. While US policy rhetoric focuses directly on a universal approach to stopping nuclear proliferation, the application of US policy has been on a case-by-case basis with multiple factors influencing whether or not the US chooses a strong or weak response to another state's nuclear ambitions. The result is that while some states have indeed been strongly confronted by the US (e.g. Iran and North Korea), others have received such weak responses that it amounted to tacit approval of their activities and thus contributed substantially to their nuclear weapons development (e.g. Israel and S. Africa). The question then to be asked is "under what conditions does the US respond strongly against a nuclear weapons program?";By utilizing a focused case study comparison approach supplemented by a Boolean analysis of the conditions tempering US nonproliferation responses, this study seeks to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for strong US responses to nuclear weapons proliferation. The generalization of these conditions will be explored both across and within cases in order to create the most complete picture possible of the elements affecting US nonproliferation policy. While alliances, proliferator designation as a rogue state, and membership in the international nonproliferation regime are somewhat consistent indicators of US responses, the importance of these variables varies significantly across stages of nuclear development. US responses to nuclear weapons development then is dependent upon not only its perceptions of a basket of both realist and liberal characteristics of the proliferating state, but the stage of nuclear development within which it must consider those characteristics.