Strategic dilemmas: States, non-state actors, and international conflict

This dissertation consists of three distinct papers that share common elements both in terms of scientific approach and substance. The first paper examines why and when states strategically consolidate disputed territory currently under their control. I find that when territory is of military importance targets of territorial challenges are increasingly likely to consolidate as they face militarily stronger challengers. In the second paper I theoretically examine the trade-offs in policy choice for states in dispute with violent non-state actors that are hosted by another state. A key result of this paper is that the use of harsh punishments (i.e., military strikes) against the host state are unsustainable in several important scenarios even when they would successfully compel host compliance. The third and final paper examines how the survival of terrorist groups is affected by factors of central theoretical interest such as state sponsorship. Contrary to the assertions of numerous scholars and observers, state sponsorship is not necessarily a blessing for groups. Rather, if a groups relies on its sponsor for its sole safe haven, this dependence is found to be harmful to the organization's survival prospects.