| In three essays, I consider presidential efforts to influence policy using signing statements. Essay one, A Theory of Presidential Signing Statements in the Legislative Arena, uses a game-theoretic model to explore how presidents will use signing statements as a tool when bargaining with Congress and what impact this tool will have on policy outcomes. In contrast to the expectations of other scholars, I show that Congress dominates congressional-executive bargaining by virtue of its position as first mover, rather than the president possessing a 'last mover advantage' due to the signing statement. Comparative static analysis of the basic model demonstrates that presidents will use the signing statement more as the costs of using the tool decrease, as the significance of the legislation increases, and as the preferences of the president and Congress diverge.; Essay two, An Empirical Analysis of Signing Statements in the Legislative Arena, utilizes an original dataset to test the predictions of the theory developed in the first essay. Considering all non-commemorative public laws and signing statements from 1985 to 2002, I find that presidents are more likely to issue signing statements to influence policy outcomes when the costs of issuing these statements decrease and as the significance of legislation increases; both of these results support the theory developed in the first essay. The results regarding preference divergence are mixed. The empirical model also demonstrates that signing statements occur with greater frequency on foreign policy legislation and on laws which previously received presidential veto threats.; Essay three, Signing Statements as a Mechanism of the Administrative Presidency, considers the signing statement as a tool for intra-branch management. While the existing literature focuses on the signing statement in the context of inter-branch bargaining, the Reagan administration originally introduced this tool as a strategic device to control statutory interpretation and implementation. Based on this, I develop and execute an empirical examination of the role of administrative agencies in the president's choice to issue signing statements. I contend that presidents are more likely to use signing statements to control policy interpretation and implementation by administrative agencies with divergent policy views. Even when controlling for interinstitutional covariates, I find support for this argument. |
