Institutionalizing security: Institutional realism and multilateral institutions in Southeast Asia

Why was not Asia "ripe for rivalry" as many scholars and pundits predicted soon after the Cold War? Why did the U.S., China, and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states engage in multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Plus Three (APT), in the 1990s? Neorealism fails to account for the institutionalization of world politics in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War. Neoliberalism cannot explain why multilateral institutions became popular only after the Cold War and why they malfunctioned during the 1997 economic crisis. Social constructivism is poorly equipped to explain multilateral cooperation in East Asia. Instead of sharing a common identity these states are divided by racial, ethnic and linguistic differences. By marrying neorealism and neoliberalism, this study introduces a new realism-based institutional theory---institutional realism to specify under what conditions states are more likely to choose institutions as their optimal strategy. By examining thoroughly three cases---the US, China, and ASEAN's foreign policies towards international institutions after the Cold War particularly towards three institutions---ASEAN, ARF, and APT, institutional realism argues that: first, the widely perceived multipolarity and high economic interdependence may cause states to engage in multilateral institutions; second, the changes of perceptions on either distribution of power or interdependence may lead to foreign policy changes. Structural comparison and qualitative process tracing are employed to evaluate the causal chains behind the decisions of the U.S., China and ASEAN. This study will theoretically enrich and broaden the realist research program in explaining institutionalization of world politics and practically draw a roadmap for states to pursue their security under anarchy and economic interdependence.