| The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the body of work philosophers have created in the field of global justice. In particular, I provide a piece of what I anticipate to be a more philosophically satisfying theory of global justice by further developing "political constructivism." One key element of political constructivism is that it views different political subjects as calling for separate investigations in light of their special features. These features are then connected with the characteristic role and content of the principles themselves. In making this connection, political constructivism stresses the role of practical reason and, consequently, views political principles as the result of practical deliberations governed by concepts appropriate to the chosen subject. For this reason, philosophers describe political constructivism as a unique view about the development and justification of political principles, stating that the correct principles of justice are those constructed under an appropriately specified hypothetical situation.; Despite the success others have had in applying constructivism to issues of domestic justice, there remain serious questions challenging its viability. In particular, the objective nature of constructed principles needs further specification and a more formidable defense. A major aim of my dissertation is to provide a deeper account of this objectivity, one that can properly address an old and serious criticism, namely, that those who do not accept the procedural device have no reason to find the constructed principles objectively valid.; A second aim is to illustrate how constructivism can be applied to global justice. I do not provide a complete theory of global justice, but instead develop starting points from which a viable constructivist theory can be worked out. I accomplish this by closely examining Rawls's The Law of Peoples and evaluating it in the manner defended earlier in the dissertation. I conclude that the theory fails to meet standards required of it and, as a result, fails to be a properly justified theory of political constructivism. In the process, however, I indicate more promising ways for a constructivist to approach global justice. |
