The rules of the game: A new historical institutionalist analysis of United States defense reorganization

The study of national security organization has been hampered by several factors. The dominant paradigms in International Relations theory tend to focus on interactions between states in the international environment or how domestic interests influence those actions. Security agencies also suffer from the lack of a common research agenda. The study of organizations is not influential in the literature of international affairs, and although there has recently been a growing literature in applying organizational principles to international relations, more remains to be done. This study is an attempt to continue that progress.; Both Realist and Liberal explanations of security agency development are, at best, incomplete. While international conditions or events may stimulate the need for reform of national security agencies, and while pluralist contests may be waged during these processes, neither directly predetermines the specific shape or evolution of those organizations. This study argues that New Historical Institutionalism is a viable theoretical approach to the study of the United States Department of Defense. It focuses on the critical juncture of unification and understanding the agency's institutional birthmarks. It then follows the development of DoD and how the legacy of the institutions created at the critical juncture determined its evolutionary path.; The findings reveal that DoD has been a captive of the autonomy of its primary sub-components, the Army, Navy and Air Force. Unification established three antagonistic, competitive and independent departments that have dominated DoD throughout its history. The inter-service roles and missions rivalry has preoccupied the department and the necessity to referee inter-service disputes inhibits Defense Secretaries from focusing on broader defense policy issues. The efforts of presidents and congresses to reform DoD have failed largely because the defining structure of the institution remains intact.; Defense reform is not an end, but a continuous journey and if the flaws in DoD are to be remedied, leadership must come from within the organization, starting with the Secretary of Defense. Alternative designs that eliminate the service designations and merge the forces into functional or regional operating units have been proposed. But if the original three-service design is maintained, the removal of institutional roadblocks to reform and overcoming the inertia of the past must begin internally. The President can (and must) support the process, and Congress can provide the statutory foundation, but real reform will only happen when the Pentagon, itself, resolves to change.