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A theory of strategic ambiguity: Credibility, transparency, and dual deterrence

Posted on:2007-12-11Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Duke UniversityCandidate:Benson, Brett VFull Text:PDF
GTID:1446390005965999Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
Intuition and international relations theory both affirm that commitments should be firm and transparent in order to be credible. Because ambiguity is believed to cut against the credibility of the commitment, it is commonly assumed that ambiguous commitments are inimical to cooperation and invite conflict. Why then do states often choose to make commitments that are deliberately ambiguous? The tension between the current state of international relations theory and empirical international politics presents a puzzle: anomalous ambiguous commitments occur despite prevailing theoretical predictions that they should undermine the credibility of the commitment by signaling weakness, creating incentives for opportunism, and, increasing the chances for misperception. My research uses formal theory, surveys, and cases studies to model and test three-party security agreements to demonstrate that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice, and, under certain conditions, ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more transparent alternatives. I demonstrate that under certain conditions deliberately ambiguous security commitments can work to deter challengers from destabilizing the status quo when transparently communicated alternatives would have the unintended consequence of bringing about the very outcome they are designed to prevent. In making this argument, my dissertation research makes three significant contributions to the study of international politics. First, it shifts our focus from credibility to variation in the type of commitment. Second, it challenges our intuition and scholarly presumption that information and transparency are strictly better by identifying some conditions under which actors are better off being ambiguous. Third, it distinguishes between various deterrence strategies for addressing dual deterrence dilemmas. In addition to the general contributions to the study of international politics, my research also adds to our understanding of the historical strategic interactions between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists and offers insights and policy implications regarding the ongoing security tensions between China and Taiwan.
Keywords/Search Tags:Theory, Commitments, Credibility, International, Strategic
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