Between foundationalism and subjectivism: Hannah Arendt and the recovery of ethical standards

Common ethical standards, once used to validate and judge public actions, have become increasingly criticized as being subjective---having no objective foundation. The scholarly responses to this situation have varied considerably. While some scholars have reacted by arguing for an objective foundation to one of the moral theories of the Western tradition, other scholars celebrate the contemporary loss of shared ethical standards.; Hannah Arendt provides a third way, a unique approach to the discussion of shared public standards. Her response avoids the theoretical extremes of both foundationalism and subjectivism. Unlike the foundationalists, Arendt argues that standards for judging human actions are provided within the sphere of action itself, i.e., the public realm. In contrast to ethical subjectivism, Arendt believes that it is important and possible to restore our awareness of, and appreciation for, relatively permanent and shared standards of human action. This dissertation explicates Arendt's restoration of non-subjective and relatively permanent ethical standards.; This project begins with an explication of Arendt's ontological description of the human activities of work and action. Arendt's ontology shows how it is possible for shared relatively permanent standards to exist. This is followed by a discussion of Arendt's understanding of history and human temporality. Non-subjective ethical standards, which arise through human action, are possible due to human temporality, i.e., our capacity to be a part of and participate in history. To conclude this project, I review and compare Aristotelian and Arendtian views of practical judgment with the intent of uncovering the practicality and practibilty of Arendt's concept of judgment. Ultimately, Arendt's discussion of judgment, while not applicable in the same manner as Aristotle's, is practicable and, therefore, relevant.