| This dissertation critically examines the relationship between large multinational firms and their host and home governments when their respective interests come into conflict. Beginning in the 1960's, developing countries began to pursue more aggressive economic and political policies targeting multinationals operating in large-scale natural resource industries, particularly in oil and mining, many of which resulted in partial or complete nationalization of these industries. The process of nationalization is a complex dynamic of power and bargaining involving firm, host country, and home country. What is of interest to this study is how the firms themselves utilized their power to negotiate the process of nationalization in their favor, i.e. emerge from the process with the least amount of financial loss. This study both challenges and goes beyond statist analyses that overstress the linkages between multinational firms and their home governments, particularly in terms of assistance, by integrating international business management and political risk analysis literature with strictly economic and political analyses of nationalization.;The assertion made in this study is that firms are more likely to utilize their own resources than seek assistance from their home governments when confronted with nationalization. The focus is hence on the successful, or unsuccessful, formation of strategies on the part of firm managers to negotiate the process of nationalization. The formation of successful strategies depends on the level of political awareness of firm managers as well as the effective use of power and bargaining. |
