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Towards a science of white-collar work: Discretion, incentives and trust in service operations and supply chain

Posted on:2007-11-06Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Northwestern UniversityCandidate:Yuen, Yiu Chi GigiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1449390005473137Subject:Engineering
Abstract/Summary:
A large portion of operations management research has focused on manufacturing-oriented work. Consequently, most modeling efforts has assumed that tasks are well-defined, tangible and unaffected by relational factors. However, service-oriented work tends to be intangible and observable, and decisions are often influenced by interpersonal relationships. In this study, we examine the impact of human factors and study how managers can cope with and even utilize them to benefit system performance. Drawing knowledge from the fields of operations management, economics, and organizational behavior, we examine three aspects of human behavior that are particularly relevant to service and professional work systems: (1) discretion in task completion due to worker judgment, (2) use of incentives to motivate workers where effort is unobservable, (3) the role of trust in information sharing.; In Chapter 2, we show that introducing discretion in task completion adds a fourth variability buffer, quality, to the well known buffers of capacity, inventory and time in operations systems. This leads to insights into capacity and variability management that are qualitatively different from those for systems with non-discretionary task completion.; In Chapter 3, we consider a new aspect of supply chain coordination - selling effort by an intermediary (wholesale) salesperson. We show how a well-chosen salesforce compensation plan can serve as a mechanism for improving supply chain efficiency. We also compare a wholesale salesperson with a traditional retail salesperson and conclude that commission plans are better suited to the retail setting, while salary plans tend to be more appropriate in wholesale environments.; In Chapter 4, we examine the role of trust in a supply chain and its development over time. We study a wholesale salesperson, acting as a representative of a manufacturer, who shares demand forecast information with a retailer. We show that regardless of the intention of the salesperson, it is almost never optimal for the salesperson to be completely honest. In long term relationships where trust is vital, we show that motivating salespersons based on retailer satisfaction may actually be a more effective strategy for the manufacturer than using a commission plan.
Keywords/Search Tags:Operations, Work, Supply chain, Salesperson, Discretion
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