Traditionalizing epistemology: Traditional theory of knowledge in a scientific world

Since the publication of Quine's landmark essay "Epistemology Naturalized," debate over the proper characterization, role, and scope of traditional epistemology has only increased. This essay develops and defends a conception of traditional epistemology against various naturalistic objections. Chapter 1 surveys the bewildering variety of ways naturalists characterize their position and distinguishes radical and moderate forms of naturalized epistemology. Chapter 2 develops and defends a traditionally-inspired meta-epistemological framework for classifying and evaluating naturalized epistemological claims. Chapter 3 introduces three distinctively traditional epistemological projects: analyzing knowledge, responding to skepticism, and formulating epistemic norms. The chapter ends with a general challenge for radical and moderate forms of naturalized epistemology; this concludes Part 1. The remainder of the essay is divided into three parts, one for each traditional project. In the introduction to each part (Chapters 4, 7, and 11) I discuss the central goal and features of these projects as traditionally understood. In subsequent chapters (Chapters 5 & 6; 8-10; 12 & 13) I respond to radical and moderate naturalistic objections. I defend various aspects of traditional epistemology and critically evaluate the prospects for naturalism. I argue that the traditional projects are legitimate and a traditional approach is defensible. The prospects for naturalism however, are not as bright. The case for naturalism is largely negative, premised on alleged shortcomings in the traditional program. If the main argument of this essay is correct and traditionalists can successfully respond to these objections, then much of the support for naturalism is eroded. Radical forms of naturalized epistemology either misunderstand the traditional questions or speciously deny their legitimacy. Moderate naturalism also comes up short. In those cases where it is most plausible, it is, arguably, least natural. And in those cases where it has the strongest claim to being naturalistic, and thus distinctive, it lacks the resources to address the relevant traditional questions. Moderate naturalism succeeds, if at all, only in answering a different question.