The Reconstruction Of Normativity Within The Context Of Naturalized Epistemology

The issue of normativity is always the challenge which the epistemology naturalists need to face to. Many opponents are doubt with naturalism by concerning the issue. So it is important for naturalists to solve it.The purpose of this dissertation is to find a position for normativity within naturalized epistemology. Firstly, there is a analysis of the proposal of Quine, that epistemology should be placed under the umbrella of the sciences. Quine makes the claim that there is no place outside of science from which one can sit in judgment. We can only accept the inherited science. This is a challenge to the traditional view of epistemology. His attempt to naturalize epistemology raises the issue of whether or not normative issues have a place within naturalized epistemology.In the article "Epistemology Naturalized", Quine gives the descriptive function for epistemology clearly. However, when we attempt to argue for a primarily descriptive view means that we are engaged in normative activity. One can not escape normative issues in epistemology.Secondly, we are concerned of the attempt to account for normativity within naturalized epistemology by placing it in the context of instrumental reason. The main point of this approach is that we may not be able to have a categorical view of rationality. So normativity is what one ought to do once the ends are identified. But the fact is that instrumental reason itself depends on a categorical view of rationality. The attempt to provide a limited normativity on the basis of instrumental rationality fails because the limited normativity of instrumental rationality cannot be explained on purely instrumental terms. The instrumental rationality does not overcome the naturalistic fallacy,but is built into it.The last approach examined is the concept of supervenience which provides a mean to account for the relation between normative and descriptive. The supervenience supposed to provide a dependency relation with the automony of either. Weak, global, and strong supervenience were examined. Weak and global supervenience were determined to be too weak to provide a dependency link. The only real candidate was strong supervenience. However, it also failed. Strong supervience can only provide is constant conjunction. So we cannot use supervenience to solve the normative issue.Then, what is the possible approach? The dissertation tries to use the view of the moderate First Philosophy. It doesn't mean that is necessary, but only possible. A specific modest naturalism was not presented, but, instead, four criteria for evaluating a modest naturalism were set forth. The first two criteria stated that any modest naturalism or First Philosophy must be fallible and revisable. The third criterion stated that it must provide some extra-scientific perspective from which to evaluate science. The final criterion stated that science must be capable of informing epistemology and epistemology must be capable of informing science in a non-circular manner. The modest naturalism provide a perspective outside of science to base normativity.Another possible approach is normativity constructivism and hypothesis concerning normativity. The culture, society or hypothesis which are outside of science, together with natural base, are the base for the construction of normativity. To a culture, the norm of rationality is just like the other norm. Once the culture accepts the norm, it can be objective and normative. And also the norm can be designed by the Mother Nature which is opimal. If rules are built into the structure of the world according to a design plan, they are normative. These extra-science perspectives are also not absolute, but fallible. In this way, normativity has a space in naturalistic epistemology.