The bullies in their pulpits: Diversion, elite opposition, and United States conflict behavior

Despite case-specific support, empirical tests of the relationship between domestic political factors in the United States and its use of force abroad have failed to produce systematic evidence of diversion from manifest opposition to presidential policy. This dissertation seeks to address and revise theoretical expectations concerning the relationship between manifest political opposition and the use of force. Following in part from Wildavsky's "two presidencies" concept, I generally propose that presidents respond to manifest opposition to their domestic policies by addressing domestic policy and to manifest opposition to their foreign policies by addressing foreign policy. Using force abroad does not provide even obliquely viable solutions to the problems underlying domestic policy opposition; indeed, doing so can divert resources needed to ameliorate domestic problems and may even be viewed as political trickery ("wagging the dog"). Conversely, using force can serve to quell opposition to foreign policy by reasserting executive ascendancy in that realm and potentially yielding favorable outcomes to bolster popular and elite support for the policies that produced them. Empirical tests of the hypotheses derived from these expectations show that, even when controlling for international and dyad-specific factors, recent manifestations of congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy increase the likelihood that the US will initiate militarized incidents abroad, while recent manifestations of congressional opposition to domestic policy decrease that likelihood for the period 18661988. Additionally, presidents are more inclined to make major domestic policy proposals and changes when facing congressional domestic policy opposition than when not.