Singular reference in 'Naming and Necessity' (Saul Kripke)

We have names in order to refer to objects. But how does reference work? One possibility is that reference is mediated by descriptive beliefs that speakers associate with names. This is the approach taken by descriptive theories of reference like those of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Another possibility is that names refer to objects directly, without the mediation of descriptions believed by speakers. This is the approach of the direct reference strategy pioneered by Saul Kripke. Descriptivist and direct reference views are usually thought to be opposed.; My aim in the dissertation is to sketch some details of a moderate view incorporating desirable elements from both descriptivist and direct reference strategies. The moderate view emerges from a critical examination of Kripke's arguments in Naming and Necessity.; Linguistic practice. I argue that Kripke's attack on classic descriptivism is not strong enough to refute a moderate descriptivist view. The moderate descriptivist view can be produced, in part, by relativizing individuating knowledge to speakers and showing the needed semantic contribution of these beliefs to a name on an occasion of use. The account of speaker-relative individuating knowledge also helps to reconceive Kripke's causal historical picture. My reinterpretation of Kripke's causal historical picture bolsters the moderate view by explaining sameness of reference for different speakers using the same name, even when speakers do not share beliefs in common.; Modality and cognitive significance. Kripke calls genuine naming expressions rigid designators. I argue that Kripke's modal arguments fail to support the claim that names are rigid designators and that descriptions are not. Finally, I take up the issue of cognitive significance. I argue that Kripke's account of cognitive significance and identity statements does not recommend a direct reference view over a descriptivist view. I then examine the direct reference theories advanced by David Kaplan, John Perry and Howard Wettstein. I argue that my moderate view does a better job of dealing with cognitive significance problems than do these direct reference alternatives.