Naturalism and normativity: Sellars and McDowell on mind, perception, and world

It is often thought that a normative account of the mental is in conflict with a naturalistic philosophy of mind. This is thought to be so because the space of reasons, the space that governs full-fledged intentional states, cannot be accounted for in empirical terms. What is unique about the thought of Wilfrid Sellars is that he thinks the mental is irreducibly normative and that this is compatible with a naturalistic philosophy of mind. To demonstrate this Sellars elaborates an enormously complex philosophical strategy which brings out the way in which the scientific and manifest images of the world can be brought together in a 'Synoptic View'. The dissertation is an internal critique of this strategy. It is an internal critique because it demonstrates that the possibility of Sellars' 'Synoptic Vision' relies upon meta-philosophical claims that are not permissible within the terms of Sellars' own system.;The heart of the dissertation focuses on Sellars' theory of perceptual intentionality, which he characterizes as a critical direct realism. We attempt to demonstrate how Sellars' drive to achieve a naturalistic theory of mind distorts his critical direct realism, specifically, by forcing him to misinterpret the place of sensation. This misinterpretation, in turn, opens the way for his naturalism. Here, of course, we are moving in a circle. We try to break out of this circle by reinterpreting the place of sensation in a satisfactory critical direct realism. This reinterpretation, we claim, enacts an internal transformation of Sellars' thought such that perceptual intentionality can be explained in a sufficiently naturalistic fashion, while avoiding the more malignant aspects of his scientific realism. Because we interpret John McDowell's thought as an attempt to deliver this type of position, we have included a final chapter on his work.