A STUDY OF WILFRID SELLARS' REALISM

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Wilfrid Sellars' realism. I divide Sellars' realism into three components: (1) his argument for realism as against idealism, (2) his argument for scientific realism, and (3) his argument for limiting the scope of his realism to the entities of microphysics. Realism claims reality is both (1) ontologically independent of, and (2) possesses a characterization distinct from an experiencing subject. An argument for realism can be distinguished from an argument to determine the nature of such a reality. That is, once one accepts realism, the next question becomes that of defending a method or methods to reveal the nature of such a reality. In other words, science supplies the methodology whereby reality is to be legitimately investigated. Therefore, it is no wonder that Sellars' realism is usually labeled "scientific" realism. Assuming that the only methodology accepted is scientific, Sellars' ontology need not necessarily be limited to the scope of entities recognized by microphysics. Sellars, however, does accept such a limited scope with his displacement argument whereby the manifest image with its commitment to persons and physical objects is replaced by the theoretical entities of physics making up the scientific image.;Concerning point (2) I argue against Sellars' sole reliance on science as the key to unlocking the nature of reality. Sellars does not move beyond the innocuous claim that science provides the best method to investigate the domain of science. What I suggest is that a variety of approaches to discovering the nature of reality be adopted. For example, the methodology employed by common-sense, religion, the arts etc., contribute on an equal level to providing a complete description of reality. Sellars' assignment of explanatory priority to science rests on his identification of explanation with causal explanation. Causal explanation is further analyzed in terms of lawfulness which results in the ontological commitment to those entities that exhibit the greater lawfulness. I argue that there are equally legitimate modes of explanation that do not fit the causal model.;Concerning point (3) I argue Sellars' displacement of the common-sense world of physical objects and persons cannot be reduced to the entities of the scientific image, Sellars claims the microparticles of physics can perform the same functions as the physical objects and persons of the manifest image, and therefore can legitimately replace these entities. In contrast, I argue that Sellars must make an ontological commitment to persons and physical objects which results in the expansion of the scope of the entities of his realism beyond those recognized in microphysics.;I propose to reject all three aspects of Sellars' realism: (1) his argument to establish realism, (2) his argument for scientific realism, and (3) his argument to limit the scope of existing entities to those of microphysics. Concerning point (1) I argue that Sellars' employment of Wittgenstein's picturing relation found in the Tractatus is not adequate to establish realism. With Sellars' rejection of the "myth of the given" there is no epistemological link between language and the world. Sellars' defense of a role theory of meaning supplies him with a means to capture both transframework and extra-framework objects. The basic entities of Sellars' ontology are basic particulars each of which exemplifies one non-relational property. Along with arguing against such a formulation of realism, I want to suggest an alternative formulation of realism. With the acceptance of the causal theory of meaning and reference, I am able to justify a nonepistemic given along with supplying a satisfactory account of transframework and extra-framework objects. I also argue that the basic entities of a coherent realism must be natured objects rather than Sellars' natureless particulars.