Modality, reductionism, and material adequacy: A rejection of reductionism

I argue that all factualist reductionist accounts of the ground of modality are either materially inadequate, or circular. By modality I mean the mode of truth or falsity of a proposition (i.e., contingently true or false, or necessarily true or false). A factualist reductionist account of the ground of modality takes modal propositions to have truth-value, and proposes that these are grounded in the non-modal. A reductive account is materially adequate only if it assigns the correct truth-value to each modal proposition. A reductive account is non-circular only if it neither explicitly nor implicitly has modality in its analysans.; I divide reductionist accounts into what I take to be exhaustive types, and then consider the best representatives of those types, and argue that they are either materially inadequate or circular. I then argue that it follows by analogy that any account in each type will be materially inadequate or circular. I divide the accounts into the following types: Anti-realists argue that modality is grounded in some fact about some mind (e.g., in language use). I divide anti-realism into two further subtypes. Realists argue that modality is grounded mind-independently. I also divide realism into two subtypes.; Chapter one is my introductory chapter in which I lay the ground work. In chapter two I consider conventionalism and the divine command theory as my representatives of the two subtypes of anti-realist accounts. In chapter three I consider David Lewis's modal realism as my representative of one type of realist account. In chapter four I consider combinatorialism as my representative of another type of realist account. Finally in chapter five I consider various ways that reductive accounts might be salvaged, and argue that these attempts fail. I conclude that no modal proposition is grounded even partly in a non-modal fact.