'Secundum naturam hominis' An essay on human form and moral goodness

In this dissertation, I develop and defend a version of Aristotelian naturalism, according to which moral goodness is a sub-determination of the category of natural goodness. While philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot have recently breathed new life into Aristotelian naturalism, the view also faces number of challenges and unresolved questions. I work systematically through a series of questions, each of which is often taken to raise difficulties for Aristotelian naturalism: What is the relation between Aristotelian natural norms and evolutionary accounts of life? If human goodness is a kind of natural goodness, how do we come to know what is true of "the human?" And how is our ethical knowledge of human form informed by accounts of human nature in the social sciences? How does the Aristotelian notion of human good fit with the tensions and conflicts we find in the moral life, and the seemingly divided nature of human beings? I develop an Aristotelian account that addressees each of these questions. The result is a sustained vindication of the Aristotelian claim that moral goodness is the natural goodness of "the human." I also show how Aristotelian modes of thought can make a contribution to substantive ethical debates. Having defended an Aristotelian framework in earlier chapters, in the final chapter I employ Aristotelian categories in an analysis of labor exploitation and its significance for global socioeconomic justice.