Transition in the lower court appointment process: A periodic analysis of executive-Senate cooperation and conflict

The recent partisan conflict over federal judicial appointments clearly cannot be seen as a revelation. Political scientists and the public at large have focused much attention upon the contentious executive---Senate relationships within the modern appointment process and the general lack of cooperation that now takes place in the filling out the federal bench. However, it was not known that contemporary disputes over the identities of federal judges were merely the latest manifestation of periodic transition within the process.; From the turn of the twentieth century, the executive---Senate relationship has gone from a regime of executive independence over the selection of nominees and a reactive Senate approach to their confirmation, to a regime of pervasive senatorial influence over the identities of judicial nominees, and finally to the current regime of failed bargaining and conflict at the confirmation stage. This dissertation analysis draws such a conclusion with a broad theoretical approach to the appointment process that comprises both the selection and confirmation of judicial nominees. The hypotheses that stem from this comprehensive approach are evaluated with a new database of appointment events and empirical models that together show that the judicial appointment process is not only different today, but also that significant change took place within the earlier era of seemingly harmonious outcomes.; While this overall conclusion is new and substantively interesting, the following analysis also provides systematic explanations of the observed transition. The movements to Senate influence over judicial selection and to controversies over confirmation are the product of realigning party coalitions and varying partisan control of the Senate, as well as the transformation of the Supreme Court agenda, which brought new attention to salient civil liberties and rights disputes. A more common explanation, in the form of active interest group participation, is not supported by this analysis. The alteration of the lower court appointment process has primarily been a function of variation within the three branches of government.