Sentencing reform and the influence of courtroom communities: Oregon's Measure 1

This study examines the implementation and impact of sentencing reform following passage of Oregon's Measure 11 "Get Tough" sentencing law. The study addresses court-level changes in case selection, processing, and disposition practices, as well as cross-jurisdictional and cross-offense variations in implementation and impact. Data was analyzed within the courtroom community framework with particular attention paid to the role of prosecutorial discretion and workgroup characteristics in shaping reform implementation and outcome.;The primary assertion of the study is that, although the implementation of mandatory minimum laws will result in some form of hydraulic displacement of discretion, it will not result in unbridled prosecutorial discretion. Instead, prosecutorial discretion will be bound by the norms of each courtroom community. Further, the specific manner in which case selection, processing and disposition patterns change following reform will differ in predictable ways across jurisdictions dependent upon the specific characteristics of each courtroom workgroup.;The study used a pretest-posttest multiple case study design with non-equivalent control groups. Case selection, processing, and disposition patterns were analyzed through secondary analysis of Oregon felony sentencing data and data from semi-structured, purposeful interviews and questionnaires. Both aggregate and cross-site analyses were conducted. The analytic techniques utilized included independent sample t-tests; two-way between-group ANOVA; and log-linear and chi-square analyses. Theoretical replication was used to determine the manner and extent to which actual and expected patterns matched, and the extent to which they differed across workgroup types.;Results of these analyses showed significant differences across workgroups and offense categories in terms of case selection, processing and disposition. Findings indicate that these differences are related to variations in workgroup-level implementation policies - which are primarily determined by the prosecutor. The results of these analyses provide an enhanced understanding of general case selection, processing and disposition pattern changes which occur in the wake of sentencing reform; site-specific changes attributable to differences in workgroup characteristics; and the mechanics of workgroup-level sentencing reform implementation.