| Oversight of the U.S. intelligence community has been a difficult subject to examine because of secrecy. Most studies have been centered on congressional oversight of the intelligence community, because the U.S. Congress tends to be more accessible than executive branch agencies. In contrast, this study investigates how both the legislative and executive branches oversee the intelligence community, and it disaggregates executive branch oversight to discern differences between agencies. The primary question this study seeks to answer is: "Do the ways in which congressional and executive branch officials approach intelligence oversight tend to differ in distinct patterns? If so, why and to what effect?" Its primary source materials were declassified and public record documents, and elite interviews with legislators, congressional staff, White House officials, and intelligence agency personnel. The interviews concentrated on two periods during the Clinton administration, 1993-1994 and 1999-2000. The oversight activity each respondent described was categorized in terms of its objective, focus, means, and timing. Based on prior research about oversight in general, the approaches described by respondents were categorized as either a priori or ex post facto. The former efforts tend to be anticipatory, while the latter are reactionary. It was expected that congressional oversight would tend to be reactionary, while executive branch oversight would tend to be anticipatory. However, the findings departed from the expected results. Probably due to the pressure of outside events, neither branch of government seemed to privilege one style over another in a consistent fashion. Institutional demands and personal priorities seemed to influence the oversight style equally. Despite anticipatory intentions, the intrusion of unpredictable events forced overseers into a reactionary position. The most important general explanatory factors seem to be: personal motivations, time constraints, and external events. In fact, during the Clinton administration, it appears that oversight of the U.S. intelligence community was tied to personal incentives. Thus oversight styles by the Executive and Congress appear to be set by institutional boundaries and motivated by individuals at a speed and direction set by events outside of the overseers' control. |
