Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes

How do states maintain their authority given that even weak non-state groups are now capable of challenging states by resorting to irregular warfare? In Part I of the dissertation, I propose that one of the ways in which states pursue internal security is by recruiting civilians into lightly armed self-defense units referred to as civilian defense forces (CDFs). In their role as government auxiliaries, these units assist the counterinsurgency (COIN) effort by counteracting insurgent guerrilla tactics. CDFs' relative affordability, local intelligence, and the propaganda value of coopting civilians, help offset insurgents' superior mobility, concealment, and covert civilian support. Empirical tests of the argument on two different crossnational data sets of all insurgencies completed between 1945 and 2006 reveal that incumbents who deploy CDFs are 53 percent more likely to be victorious. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than many state attributes such as economic development or military power, CDFs appear to be an effective COIN policy deserving of further academic and policy attention.;The finding that this particular COIN policy is associated with incumbent victory raises an important theoretical puzzle. Namely, if CDFs really are as beneficial to COIN, why do all incumbents not deploy them? In Part II of the dissertation, I lay out a formal principal-agent model which posits incumbent fear of civilian defection to rebels as the main impediment to CDF formation. However, the model also reveals that this impediment should be more easily overcome in areas predominantly populated by tribal groups, where pre-existing intertribal blood feuds incentivize them to comply with the principal's wishes in order to maintain CDF membership and therefore an advantage relative to local rivals. Consistent with theoretical expectations, empirical analyses of a novel province-level data set (N=100) encompassing Turkey and the Philippines suggest that areas with substantial tribal populations tend to station twice as many CDF personnel as those with no tribal populations.