| In this dissertation, I address the topic of engagement, a frequently mentioned but poorly understood instrument of foreign policy. My analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I critique the various conceptualizations of engagement that are presently circulating in the International Relations (IR) literature and propose an alternative definition, namely, the attempt to peacefully influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts and interdependence with that state across multiple issue areas (diplomatic, economic, military, cultural). Second, I take issue with a nascent conventional wisdom among IR scholars that the U.S. will be more likely to successfully engage autocratic states than democratic or democratizing states. Rather, I advance a theory that contrarily hypothesizes that the U.S. will tend to more successfully engage democratic or democratizing states than autocratic ones. It primarily attributes this variation in outcomes to a bargaining pathology that is created when the U.S.---a "weak state" characterized by the fragmentation and dispersion of political power---engages autocracies, but not when it engages democracies. The theory also proposes that the engagement process can be partially influenced by two condition variables: the systemic threat context within which the engagement attempt transpires and the economic allure of the target state to U.S. business interests. Third, I test these rival theories in four case studies of U.S.---led engagement: (1) Italy, 1947--53; (2) Iraq 1981--1988; (3) Iraq, 1988--90; and (4) South Africa, 1981--86. In all four cases, my "oversell-overcommitment theory" more accurately explains the dynamics and outcome of engagement. |
