The cycle of violence between terrorism and repression

The goals of this dissertation are to understand 1) whether or how repression increases or contributes to the initiation of terrorism; 2) whether or how terrorism influences the use of repression; and 3) whether or how counterterrorism policies either deter future terrorist acts or cause backlash and increase terrorism. This understanding has the potential to inform significant policy questions for governments that seek to end/prevent terrorism. Governments most often handle a perceived threat to state security by creating and implementing certain policies in order to protect their citizens. The potential consequences of the policies are mixed. Some may be successful and deter terrorism, whereas others may not be as successful and could possibly increase or even create terrorism. In addition, policies to deter terrorism run the risk of being repressive. In Chapter Two I look at how terrorism can affect the use of repressive measures by governments. Specifically I examine separately how domestic and transnational terrorism affects repression. I find that domestic terrorism provokes the repression of physical integrity rights in general and also increases the likelihood of each of the four individual physical integrity rights. In Chapter Three I use case studies to exam how the use of both forms of government repression affects the incidences of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks and vice versa. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between terrorism and repression by examining terrorist activity in four countries, the governments' responses to the terrorist activity, and whether or not the government responses produced the desired result of reducing terrorist activity. My case studies illustrate the need for more lenient policies when facing terrorism rather than using repression. In certain cases, repression works, but these measures are generally only tolerated when they affect civil liberties, especially those liberties of an unpopular minority group. Finally in Chapter Four, I test the relationship between terrorism and repression in Western Europe by using backlash and deterrence models. The focus of this chapter is to explore how terrorism and certain government actions affect each other in a narrow region, Western Europe, by analyzing whether state actions actually deter the alienated members of the population from using violence or whether these actions create a backlash of violence. I find that governments who respond to terrorist acts with an immediate response have the greatest chance of not deterring terrorism and, instead, causing a backlash in terrorism. In regards to specific government actions, I find that governments which respond with armed actions are likely to deter terrorism rather than cause a backlash of terrorism.