The democratic difference: Regime type and the frequency of war, 1816--1992

Understanding the relationship between democracy and war is an important topic in the study of international relations. While most of our attention has been given to the relationship among democracies, the more fundamental question of democracy's general effect, independent of opponent type, has been overlooked. This is more the result of limits in our conceptualization than of any lack of empirical evidence. Based on our knowledge of the way democracy work, one would expect that when the expected military costs of war are high, democracies will start fewer wars than nondemocracies. However, when those costs are low, there will be little observable difference between regime types. This implies that while war will not disappear as a feature of international relations, the frequency of high cost wars might decline as the number of democracies increase. For these reasons, the effect of democracy is neither the panacea nor the illusion that it is typically portrayed to be.; This pattern is the product of four specific democratic differences. The first is the relatively greater number of political actors. By distributing potential gains among more actors the material benefits of war will be lower. The second difference is the formalization of political participation. This has the effect of reducing the size of political sanctions and rewards while increasing the frequency with which they will be given out. Ultimately, this makes democratic states more responsive to societal preferences and increases the volatility or variance of the likelihood of fighting. The third difference is the absence of political repression. Its presence means that nondemocracies can have additional material incentives and can face an even lower prospect of political sanctions. This can further increase the nondemocratic incentive to fight. The fourth difference is the greater transparency and openness of the political process. This makes information about the military costs more readily available to societal actors. Thus, with better information, societal actors in democracies are able to act and influence the state sooner than their nondemocratic counterparts. This will make democracies appear to be more sensitive to military costs.