Liberal equality: A contractual defence

Modern liberal-democratic societies are pluralistic, that is, their citizens are divided along cultural, religious, and linguistic lines, among others. This pluralism creates a fundamental problem for democratic governments attempting to foster core liberal values such as equality and freedom, because it is not obvious what form equal freedom should take among people divided in these ways. How should democratic governments treat dissimilar citizens equally?; This dissertation examines the question by investigating the theoretical foundations of liberalism, bringing together classic and contemporary debates about the implications of pluralism for liberal equality. It argues that contractualism is the most appropriate response to pluralism, and that neutrality between the contested ethical ideals of democratic citizens is a fundamental requirement of contractualism. Part One explores three classic debates about the legitimacy of enforcing contested ethical ideals, in the context of religious, cultural and sexual pluralism. Part Two demonstrates why the most influential rival view of political morality in recent philosophy---perfectionism---violates liberal egalitarian norms that we have important reasons to accept. Part III explains what those norms are and why we should accept them, and defends a variant of state neutrality between contested ethical ideals as the best interpretation of equal freedom in pluralistic societies such as ours.