'Neither illusion nor despair': Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) effectiveness in detecting non-compliance following the adoption of 'Program 93+2' (Iraq, Korea, Iran)

The purpose of this dissertation is to critically examine the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, and to evaluate the possibility of a non-nuclear-weapons state who is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program undetected by the IAEA. The main finding of this dissertation is that gaps that existed in the old IAEA safeguards regime prior to the adoption of "Program 93+2" remain.{09} Therefore, the strengthened IAEA safeguards, although more effective than the old one, still leaves opportunities for a non-nuclear-weapons state to develop clandestine nuclear weapons program undetected by the IAEA.; To assess the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards, this dissertation proposes a general model of "Five C's" to assess the effectiveness of international regimes---Compliance, Coverage, Counterfactuals, Cohesiveness, and Change. Based on these five criteria, the gaps in the old regime are identified using case studies: Iraq (1962--1991), North Korea (1965--1994), and Iran (1967--2004). Each of the cases highlights the gaps and loopholes in the old safeguards system. Following the identification of the loopholes in the old regime, the new regime is examined in order to determine whether it has resolved these deficiencies. This dissertation demonstrates that the content of the safeguards system, coupled with the IAEA's verification practices, although created a strong safeguards system, its primary objectives, namely deterrence and detection of non-compliance were not achieved.; The last part of the dissertation offers policy recommendations. These close the remaining gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation safeguards system to effectively deter and detect non-compliance.