| The judiciary is an integral part of the political process, and is itself inherently shaped by the political system. The elected branches influence the judiciary, not only when they exercise the constitutional checks available to them, but also when they go about their basic legislative and executive functions. Likewise, judicial decisions, rules, conduct and functions contribute to the political environment. This dissertation applies Positive Political Theory to the study of the judiciary, to develop an understanding of the judiciary as a political institution.; Three aspects of the judiciary's political nature are examined here: how senatorial courtesy shapes judicial selection, how judges shape their agendas by signaling their case preferences, and how the political system encourages judicial solutions to social conflict. Solving these puzzles provides new insights into the core processes of judicial appointments, judicial decision-making and agenda setting, and the causes of litigiousness. Additionally, the exploration of each of these theses both originates from, and contributes to, an overall conception of the judiciary as a political institution.; The three chapters exploit a variety of Positive Political Theory methodologies: game theory, spatial models, and signaling models. Each methodology provides a means of predicting players' strategic actions and the outcomes that will result. |
