Autonomy-Security Trade-Offs in Asymmetric Alliances: The Cases of the DPRK-PRC and the ROK-U.S. Alliances

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the autonomy-security trade-offs model of asymmetric alliance. Morrow's argument on the trade-offs between autonomy and security among alliance members has never been empirically tested. This research is the first attempt to prove or disprove the autonomy-security trade-off model with a focus on the benefits from formation of asymmetric alliance. To do that, this research has set two principle tasks. First is to empirically test the autonomy-security trade-offs model of asymmetric alliance. The second is to apply the findings from the empirical test of the autonomy-security trade-off model of asymmetric alliance to the cases of the DPRK - PRC alliance and the ROK - U.S. alliance and evaluate their influence on inter-Korean relation.;The empirical test of the model is composed of two parts: the first part tests the security benefit argument of the theory and the second part tests the autonomy supply argument of the theory. The first Probit analysis on the security benefit argument strongly supports the autonomy-security trade-off model. The first independent variable, allied with a major power country, shows a statistically significant deterrent effect. Also, higher level of alliance commitment such as an offense pact with a major power country shows a deterrent effect as well.;The findings of the empirical tests on the autonomy benefit argument also support the autonomy-security trade-off model. This research tests whether minor power alliance partners participate in the conflict initiated by major power alliance partners. The outcome of the empirical analysis suggests that minor power alliance partners are more likely to participate when major power alliance partners maintain superiority in capabilities. The statistical analysis also finds a positive correlation between the level of alliance commitment and the likelihood of minor power alliance partner's participation, suggesting that minor power alliance partners are more likely to participate in a conflict when they are signed into relatively higher levels of alliance commitment with major power countries.;Two asymmetric alliances in North East Asia are selected for case study: the DPRK - PRC alliance and the ROK - U.S. alliance. This research claims that, although the PRC remains the major supporter for the DPRK, the DPRK's inability to function as a minor alliance partner, which provides autonomy benefits to the major power alliance partner, destabilizes the alliance relation with the PRC. On the other hand, the ROK provided an autonomy benefit for the U.S. and the U.S. provided security benefits for the ROK. By doing so, the two nations have built and managed a strong alliance.