Practical reasons and rationality

Rational agents have reasons for action. But what about a rational agent, what about her rationality, connects her to her reasons? This question is independent of, though related to, the question of what constitutes a reason for an action for a rational creature. They relate in the following important way: if rational agents have reasons in virtue of some rational ability of theirs, then lacking that ability would preclude their having a reason. Thus a potentially strong restriction results from the account of how a rational agent connects to her reasons. A common answer to this question is desires: in virtue of having a desire an agent is connected to and can act for those considerations that give her a reason. Given the relative contingency of desires, it follows that an agent may fail to have a reason because she lacks the relevant desire, or in general, agents may fail to have reasons because of motivational issues. As I argue, however, none of our notions of desires adequately account for how agents connect to their reasons. Prominent models of desires and action distort how rational agents act in typical cases of full-blooded action. In contrast, what will connect an agent to her reasons is something essentially evaluative; namely, beliefs about value. On this view, an agent relates cognitively to the characteristics of a consideration which otherwise give the agent a reason, namely, the value of the consideration itself or the value of something associated with the consideration. Given the ability to form beliefs about value---and its status as a general ability of rational agents in contrast to a set of particular motivational states or desires---it follows that there are little restrictions from a motivational point of view on what can count as a reason for action for a given agent. What reasons an agent has or not has will be a function of the theory of value and the circumstances of the agent which are relevant.