An evaluation of the influence of NCAA Division I rules on compliance

Compliance with NCAA DI rules matters. The leaders of the NCAA, colleges and universities devise, negotiate and elect NCAA rules to address recurring problems. Despite these efforts, schools continue to violate NCAA rules. The objective intent of a rule is to affect a change in behavior; if behavior does not change, then the rule is ineffective. NCAA regulatory studies have determined that the NCAA selectively enforces its rules (Otto, 2006) and that compliance is explained as a result of economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors (Baxter & Lambert, 1991; Clark & Batista, 2009; Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Stern, 1979, 1981). However, there has not yet been a systematic study of NCAA regulation to understand the degree to which compliance is a result of NCAA rules. This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature by conducting an evaluation of NCAA DI rules against the use of recruiting inducements in men's basketball. This dissertation examines particular NCAA rules that target essentially the same issue (recruitment inducements) and ties essential features of these rules to direct outcomes. The public reports of NCAA major infractions cases from 1952 to 2010 were analyzed and data was collected on past compliance, self-reporting, penalties, and the actors cited for rules violations. A Mann-Whitney U Test was used to evaluate the effect of NCAA rule reforms on compliance; the results showed that the reforms led to no significant change in compliance. The trend analyses of compliance, self-reporting, penalties and cited actors provided real world outcomes to test theoretical propositions on compliance. The framework of compliance (Mitchell, 1994) was applied in this dissertation to evaluate how the frame and structure of rules influence compliance. The empirical and analytical findings of this dissertation support the following contentions: NCAA rules, and their attendant monitoring and enforcement systems, do not function to support compliance. NCAA rules that impose rights and obligations on actors who lack the power, ability or incentives to fulfill such responsibilities will be less successful in gaining compliance. Finally, this dissertation highlights the considerable influence of private actors and the institutional hierarchy of power on NCAA compliance.