| This dissertation studies public good provision and the social forces that impact decisions to privately provide public goods. The first essay investigates the impact of non-binding signals of support for a public good. In a field experiment involving over 24,000 employees, in 198 workplace-fundraising campaigns, providing pins that allow employees to signal support for the charity before the donation decision generates 27% more donors and 33% more money raised per campaign. In a complementary laboratory experiment, subjects who wear pins are more likely to donate, even when they wear the pin involuntarily, and donations increase from those exposed to voluntary signals of support.;The second essay investigates gift exchange and attempts to explain why we observe gift exchange in some settings and not others. The essay also speaks to a methodological debate about the relative merits of laboratory and field experiments. Critics of the laboratory argue that experimental results differ between lab and field due to unique features of laboratory methodology, including selection of subjects and experimenter scrutiny. I argue instead that results may differ due to differences in the strategic and informational environment between particular lab and field settings, including information sets and action spaces. I report results of two laboratory experiments on gift exchange and find that altering the strategic and informational environment in the lab can generate results more similar to field tests.;The final essay, joint with Stephen Leider, investigates the role of contracts on public good provision. We argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms. In a laboratory experiment, we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four public good games, and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable "handshake" agreement to take the first best action. In three games, a contract with only this handshake agreement is (at least weakly) optimal. The handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements. Our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness: establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions. |
