The base of contention: Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the U.S. in Central Asia (2001--2010)

Between 2001 and 2010, there were three periods in Kyrgyz-Russian relations during which the Kremlin used a distinct strategy to bring Kyrgyzstan, a Russian ally that has been hosting a U.S. airbase since December 2001, more fully into the Russian orbit of influence and end the country's multi-vector diplomacy. In the first period (2001--2004), Russia relied on a benign strategy. This strategy entailed the involvement of the Kyrgyz government in Russia-led economic structures and promotion of Russian culture, education and the media in Kyrgyzstan. In the second period (2005--2006), the Kremlin openly pressured the Kyrgyz leadership, albeit unsuccessfully, to evict the U.S. airbase and thus end its multi-vector diplomacy. In the third period (2007--2009), the Kremlin relied on a financial reward to win Kyrgyzstan's loyalty. Despite receiving a lavish financial package from Russia, Kyrgyzstan continued its multi-vector diplomacy and its collaboration with the U.S. base. Disgruntled with Bishkek's duplicitous behavior, Moscow adopted a series of economic and political sanctions that eventually led to the violent ouster of the Kyrgyz government in April 2010.;Two questions emerge from the observation of Kyrgyz-Russian relations between 2001 and 2010. First, what explains changes in diplomatic strategies by Russia and Kyrgyzstan in these three periods? Why did Russia rely on benign cooperation in the first stage, resort to pressure in the second stage and offer a financial reward to Bishkek in the third stage? Second, why did Bishkek's attempt at a multi-vector foreign policy appear to work in the beginning and then lead to disastrous results for Kyrgyzstan in the end?;The research project seeks to answer these questions by relying on a bargaining model. It hypothesizes that the shifts in the Russian and Kyrgyz strategies in the three periods were caused by changes in the perceptions of leaders about their bargaining powers. In the first period, bargaining power, as perceived by leaders, shifted away from both Russia and Kyrgyzstan, thus resulting in benign cooperation. In the second period, bargaining power shifted from Kyrgyzstan to Russia, prompting Moscow to rely on public pressure to achieve an outcome that it favored at a least cost for the Kremlin. In the third period, bargaining power shifted from Russia to Kyrgyzstan, enabling Bishkek to extract a lavish financial package from Moscow in return for an outcome that the Kremlin favored. When Bishkek, confident of its bargaining power, relied on political chicanery and attempted to circumvent terms of the agreement with Russia, Moscow resorted to punishment.;The research project argues that three variables shaped perceptions of leaders about their bargaining powers: (a) the degree of tension between dominant large powers such as Russia, the U.S. and China (the international level); (b) the level of elite contestation of ruling regimes (the domestic level); (c) the degree of economic resources of rule available to the ruling regimes (the domestic level).