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Models for electricity market efficiency and bidding strategy analysis

Posted on:2006-01-11Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:The University of Texas at AustinCandidate:Niu, HuiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1459390005492205Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:
This dissertation studies models for the analysis of market efficiency and bidding behaviors of market participants in electricity markets. Simulation models are developed to estimate how transmission and operational constraints affect the competitive benchmark and market prices based on submitted bids. This research contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, transmission and operational constraints, which have been neglected in most empirical literature, are considered in the competitive benchmark estimation model. Second, the effects of operational and transmission constraints on market prices are estimated through two models based on the submitted bids of market participants. Third, these models are applied to analyze the efficiency of the Electric Reliability Council Of Texas (ERCOT) real-time energy market by simulating its operations for the time period from January 2002 to April 2003. The characteristics and available information for the ERCOT market are considered.; In electricity markets, electric firms compete through both spot market bidding and bilateral contract trading. A linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) model with transmission constraints is proposed in this dissertation to analyze the bidding strategies with forward contracts. The research contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we combine forward contracts, transmission constraints, and multi-period strategy (an obligation for firms to bid consistently over an extended time horizon such as a day or an hour) into the linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium framework. As an ex-ante model, it can provide qualitative insights into firms' behaviors. Second, the bidding strategies related to Transmission Congestion Rights (TCRs) are discussed by interpreting TCRs as linear combination of forwards. Third, the model is a general one in the sense that there is no limitation on the number of firms and scale of the transmission network, which can have asymmetric linear marginal cost structures. In addition to theoretical analysis, we apply our model to simulate the ERCOT real-time market from January 2002 to April 2003. The effects of forward contracts on the ERCOT market are evaluated through the results. It is shown that the model is able to capture features of bidding behavior in the market.
Keywords/Search Tags:Market, Bidding, Model, Efficiency, Electricity, ERCOT
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