| The literature in psychology and behavioral economics offers abundant instances of anomalies to the rational choice paradigm. One of the most prominent works attempting to reconcile these is Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory. Its well-known S-shaped value function accounts for some of the anomalies such as reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. Although Prospect Theory describes the manner in which individuals are loss averse, it does not explain why people show loss aversion. In this dissertation, using the three experiments, we investigate the cognitive processes behind loss aversion. We find an anomaly in the S-shaped value function. Specifically, the studies demonstrate that the degree of involvement affects the slope of the value curve for atemporal and intertemporal choices, and in varying product vividness conditions. The data show that there is a difference in the slopes of the value function for low and high involvement decisions. For low involvement conditions, the value curve has roughly the same steepness for losses as for gains close to the neutral reference point (i.e. contrary to the diminishing sensitivity characteristic). By contrast, in the high involvement conditions this is not the case: there is a distinct difference in the slopes of the loss and gain curves. This leads us to propose that different value functions exist for people in the low and high involvement conditions. This important finding suggests that in cases where people are not highly involved with a product, they display significantly less loss aversion than predicted by Prospect Theory. |
