The right to democracy: Compliance with the election monitoring norm in transitional societies

Norms are a persistent feature of international politics. Disagreement over the effect of international norms and compliance with them is equally persistent. However, in the last decade the long-standing divide between those who believe that international norms shape state behavior and those who see norms as insignificant has given way to a more nuanced debate. This study analyzes a framework of compliance in order to understand the factors that influence compliance or non-compliance with the election-monitoring norm in transitional societies.; I argue that an effective compliance framework must include four components: Legitimacy, Response to Non-compliance Mechanisms, Redefined Interests, and a Supportive International Environment. I assess the combination of variables which are necessary and/or sufficient, as well as the converse, to bring about compliance. I demonstrate that the combination of legitimacy, redefined interests and changed identities is sufficient to bring about compliance. Furthermore, the case studies show that compliance achieved on the basis of these variables is more lasting than the compliance achieved through the application of mechanisms that respond to non-compliance. The study also shows the limits of relying solely on the mechanisms of enforcement and coercion, in the event of non-compliance as the results are usually temporary.