The End of the Closed Corral Explaining the Decline of Clientelism in Brazil

How do clientelist regimes, where politicians mobilize support through favors and individualized benefits, transition to programmatic ones, where politicians rely on electoral platforms and programmatic policies to sway voters? Clientelism constrains democratic representation and economic growth across the developing world, yet little is known about why clientelist regimes transition to programmatic ones, where politicians seek to garner support through the strength of their policy proposals and ideological commitments. In this dissertation, I draw upon the case of Brazil to develop our understanding of why transitions occur. Brazil offers an excellent case for study as long-dominant political machines recently have given way to a programmatic political system.;I present evidence that clientelism is waning in Brazil. As poverty relief traditionally took the form of handouts from politicians to voters, I pay special attention to new and purportedly technocratic antipoverty programs like Bolsa Familia, a conditional cash transfer program that provides a stipend to impoverished families and reaches a quarter of Brazil's population. My finding that many recent policy innovations in Brazil are programmatic helps explain why clientelist networks are deteriorating: with the utter poverty that once characterized vast swaths of Brazil eradicated, voters considering whether to vote against the local political boss have less to fear from retaliation.;What explains the growth of programmatic policymaking? I hypothesize that the adoption of such policies requires sufficient bureaucratic capacity. Bureaucratic capacity describes the ability of the civil service to implement programmatic policies according to technocratic (rather than political) criteria. This capacity makes politicians' claims that they will enact these programs more credible. I use a multifaceted approach to test for the importance of bureaucratic capacity. I begin by tracing the historical relationship between civil service professionalization and policymaking in Brazil from 1930 to the present. Early attempts at reform generally were overwhelmed by demands for clientelist resources. Brazil's military, which had adopted a Weberian administrative ethos during the period of "new professionalism" following World War II, was aghast at the venality, corruption, and clientelism that characterized Brazil's political system and civil service. After the 1964 coup, Brazil's military rulers expanded the role of technocratic ministries and agencies. These agencies were insulated from (clientelist) politics and handled economic management while social policies remained oriented towards patronage and clientelism. Future democratically-elected leaders could draw on this technocratic capacity should they choose to enact programmatic social policies.;I provide micro-level evidence that bureaucratic capacity can encourage programmatic voting. A novel measure of programmatic voting links municipal-level bureaucratic capacity to electoral support for programmatic policymaking. Voters from municipalities with high levels of bureaucratic capacity were more likely to engage in programmatic voting. I developed a survey to investigate whether bureaucratic capacity affects the credibility of campaign promises and voters' willingness to support a programmatic candidate. This survey uses experimental vignettes to manipulate voters' perception of capacity. Higher levels of bureaucratic capacity increase voters' willingness to support programmatic candidates.;This research offers important contributions with relevance across the developing world. As clientelism subverts the democratic process, this dissertation reveals how polities can attain superior forms of democratic representation. In addition, since programmatic systems provide higher levels of public goods, they also foster democratic consolidation because voters are more likely to associate economic gains with democracy. Finally, by highlighting the importance of bureaucratic capacity, this dissertation has practical policy implications for other political systems that find themselves burdened by clientelist politics.