Choosing clientelism: Political competition, poverty, and social welfare policy in Argentina

Why do some local governments perform well, delivering goods and services to their citizens in a way that facilitates equal access to these services, while others perform poorly, distributing goods in a clientelistic manner that links the receipt of goods and services to political loyalty? In this dissertation, I offer a theory of variation in clientelism that focuses on differences in the incentives reelection-seeking politicians face to use clientelism depending on voter poverty and levels of political competition. I then test this theory using an original dataset on municipal-level clientelism and an original survey experiment in Argentina.; Most theoretical treatments of clientelism focus on the relationship between politicians and poor voters, and they therefore emphasize the electoral benefits of clientelism. In contrast, I explore the effects of clientelism on the voting preferences of both poor and middle class voters: while clientelism can be an effective tool to gain votes from the poor, it may be at the cost of lost political support from the middle class. The trade-off between the costs and benefits of clientelism is likely to be most acute when competition for office is intense. Thus, in high competition settings, clientelism should be increasingly likely as constituent poverty increases. In contrast, constituent poverty should be a far less powerful determinant of the use of clientelism when political competition is low.; I find substantial empirical support for this hypothesis using an original dataset that documents the use of clientelism in the implementation of Argentina's largest food distribution program in a sample of Argentine municipalities. The results of a survey experiment in Argentina also support the claim that middle class voters withdraw their support from politicians who use clientelism. The dissertation thus helps explain a phenomenon, clientelism, that seriously erodes citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable even within a democratic setting.