| The dissertation consists of three research works about special topics of financial intermediation. The main goal of the first study is to determine the effect of some corporate governance-related variables on bank initial public offerings (IPOs). The testable hypotheses involve three dependent variables: abnormal offer price, initial return or underpricing, and long-term performance. The proposed independent variables have no explanatory power on the cross-sectional variation of the abnormal offer price. The proportion of outside directors, the size of the bank, directors and officers' (D&O) equity based compensation plans, and the age of the bank, all have a positive relationship with the level of underpricing. The variables, nominating committee independence, directors' knowledge and experience, and directors' reputation, have the hypothesized positive relationship with the sample's long-run performance. The main goal of the second research work is the analysis of a sample of self-underwritten IPOs. The analysis includes the IPOs' underpricing; long-term performance; lockup and quiet period; risk; volume; and failure and acquisitions. The main result of this study is that here are no significant differences on the level of underpricing between self-underwritten IPOs and conventional IPOs underwritten by independent underwriters. The only significant result about the long-run performance of self-underwritten IPOs is on the subsample of nonpenny stocks, where the larger the firm the lower the long-run performance. The third research work focuses on going private transactions of financial institutions. This study includes the analysis of the cross-sectional differences of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) that result from the public announcement of a going private transaction proposal. Similarly, this study tests the long-run performance and the risk change of those firms that stay public after the withdrawal of a going private transaction. The main results suggest that public announcement of a going-private transaction produces positive CARs of about 15 percent. The public announcement of the withdrawal of a going-private transaction generates negative CARs between -4 percent and -5 percent. The total risk of the sample with respect to the matching group experiences a positive and significant increase after the public announcement of a going-private transaction proposal. |
