Punishment from the top down? Federal influence on state-level criminal justice policy

Numerous scholars have suggested that the federal government has been partially responsible for the rising number of inmates in state correctional systems. Despite these assertions, previous studies have failed to demonstrate why the crime issue became so politically attractive to federal elected officials, how these actors attempted to influence state policy, which states were most amenable to federal influence, or if that influence had any appreciable impact on state-level outcomes.; Recognizing these questions, this dissertation develops a theory in three parts in order to explain the federal government's influence over state-level criminal justice policy during the past twenty years. Specifically, it suggests that the negative social construction and limited political power of lawbreakers made a tough anti-crime position politically attractive to federal officials. In order to transmit those preferences regarding crime policy to the states, the national government focused on influencing the structures that determine state-level outputs, rather than attempting to directly influence outcomes. Specifically, it relied on both monetary and symbolic policy tools, offering grant programs rewarding more punitive states and crafting retributive federal statutes, which served to stimulate the diffusion of similar policies in the states. All states were not, however, equally amenable to such influence and the theory suggests that the federal government had the largest impact on crime policy in states that were most ideologically similar to itself.; The empirical analysis demonstrates that social construction theory provides a plausible explanation for the vehemence of federal anti-crime rhetoric since 1980. In addition, there is strong evidence that the federal government exercised considerable influence over state spending on law enforcement and corrections, as well as over the adoption of legislation designed to impose harsher sanctions on criminals. The findings also suggest that state government preferences were the most important predictor of susceptibility to federal influence. Only in those states with a punitive preference for criminal justice, were federal actions successful in stimulating state spending or influencing state policy adoptions.