Security as Satisfaction Conventional Arms Transfers and the International Order

The notion of interstate satisfaction is a central tenet of the Power Transition Theory paradigm. Challenging states are presumed to initiate war during power transitions when they are dissatisfied with the status quo international hierarchy. To date, empirical tests of international politics implement measures based on alliance similarity to proxy for satisfaction. Although this measure captures the base alignments of states, it is limited in its variation over time, and does not always capture the dynamic changes in the alignment of states with respect to the global status quo. This research looks to conventional armament transfers as a germane measure of international satisfaction, as the trade is a regular phenomenon and is self-regulated; proposed transfers are scrutinized for congruence with the exporter's foreign policy. By applying a boundary value problem solution via the direct multiple shooting method to conventional arms transfer data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a country-year security alignment measure is derived for the years 1950-2008. An S-score computation is then applied to this country-year measure in order to create a dyadic security satisfaction variable. The new measure is compared to the alliance-based S-score for select dyads from varying regions to compare performance. To assess improvements, the measure is tested in an established model of militarized interstate disputes. The measure is then incorporated in a Power Transition regression of conflict severity, as well as a Cox proportional hazards regression of conflict initiation for global and regional contenders. The results are robust, with a doubling of the explanatory power using the new measure. The research indicates that military transfer relationships within the global hierarchy better reflect interstate security satisfaction, and better explain conflict initiation than extant measures predicated on alliance commitments.