| This dissertation aims to present and evaluate the arguments of traditional free-will theists against process theists' claim of a philosophical and religious superiority of their solution to the problem of evil and the arguments of process theists in defense of their claim. I begin by examining how process theists answer the challenge of traditional free-will defenders and Reformed epistemologists that process theism's superiority cannot be maintained on the basis of its alleged ability to provide a more adequate theodicy because a sufficiently rational solution to the problem of evil does not require a theodicy, and even of it did, there would be no worldview-transcendent standards by which relative theodicy adequacy could be adjudicated. I then examine the debate between process theologians and those traditional free-will theists who, contra free-will defenders, affirm the appropriateness of theodicy and argue that process theism is better countered by showing that Whiteheadian theodicy is not more adequate in terms of relevant inter-perspectival facts and principles than theodicies constructed within the traditional free-will framework. Accordingly, I venture to investigate, from a non-partisan perspective, which, if any, of the respective forms of theism, provides a stronger theodicy in terms of the following inter-perspecctvvl criteria: (1) non-contradiction of the reality of genuine evil; (2) adequacy to eschatological hope as a part of a distinctively Christian response to evil; (3) relative freedom from unanswered/unanswerable questions arising within the theistic framework in question. My research shows that traditional free-will theism presently manifests considerably more inadequacies in terms of the above criteria than process theism. However, because the position's overall adequacy and plausibility also includes adequacy to private existential-religious evidence, individuals can nonetheless be rational in holding that traditional theism is overall not less adequate than the process alternative. As to the question of whether we could make an inference from the position's superior objective adequacy to its superior probable truth, my conclusion is that it is premature to give a definite answer at this time. Moreover, this adjudication could, in principle, be done only on the premise of a Whiteheadian epistemology affirming non-sensory perception that traditional free-will theists normally reject. |
