| Before passage of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, the congressional budget process was highly decentralized. Spending power was distributed amongst various appropriations committees and subcommittees, who were thought to act as "guardians" of the Treasury (Fenno 1973). The 1974 Budget Act changed this by shifting the guardian role from the Appropriations Committees to the Budget Committees. What this dissertation will show is that since 1974, the guardian role has changed. As parties have become stronger and budgetary issues more polarizing, parties have strategically used the budget rules to "guard" their policy territory.;Since 1974, revisions to the budget process have imposed additional limitations on Congress's spending power. Not surprisingly, the rules are frequently waived; and selective enforcement of the rules may be an effective means of shaping the legislative agenda. I have found that majority parties in the House and Senate often use rules and procedures in ways that shape the legislative agenda at all phases of the congressional budgetary process.;This dissertation proceeds as follows. The first two chapters provide an introduction to the central questions of this dissertation, review the relevant literature, and place this work in context. The third chapter describes the history and development of the congressional budgetary process. It also provides a theoretic framework for understanding how budgetary rules and procedures influence congressional behavior and the legislative agenda.;The remaining chapters test party influence during key phases of the congressional budgetary process. In the first chapter, I found that party leaders can play a decisive role at the conference stage. Parties are able to control the selection of budget conferees. Also, the relative, conditional strength of House and Senate majority parties may determine who wins during conference negotiations. The next chapter examines passage and roll rates on budget waivers and finds that parties frequently may use budget rules in an attempt to control the agenda.;The concluding chapter summarizes the main points of this dissertation and briefly explores the potential electoral motives Congress might have for reforming the congressional budgetary process. |
