| In this dissertation I examine Isaiah Berlin's view of pluralism. Where some have claimed that Berlin cannot justify his commitment to liberalism given his ideas about moral pluralism---that his views are subjective---I argue that he can justify his commitment to liberalism, and avoid the problems of relativism. The departing point of my study is that unlike many, I do not think it is necessary to explicate Berlin's opinions about history, nationalism, or similar ideas---that what he says about pluralism is logically distinct from his other views. My argument has two basic parts. In the first I argue that Berlin's conception of pluralism is best understood as a response to monism, and not necessarily as a position which stands alone. As I argue, Berlin's commitment to liberalism depends less upon direct links between liberalism and pluralism, than a critique of monism which shows how vis-a-vis the corruption of positive liberty, monism leads to authoritarianism. The second part of my argument revolves around the idea that pluralism and relativism are distinct ideas, as seen in their treatment of the idea of incommensurability. Pluralism, I argue, unlike relativism, allows for comparative judgments to be made between values and cultures, because of certain assumptions it holds regarding human nature. Thus the charge that Berlin is a relativist is incorrect, in so far as it fails to consider the theoretical differences between pluralism and relativism. |
