Norms and membership conditionality: The role of European institutions in ethnic politics in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania

This dissertation asks if, when and how international institutions can use the traditional tools of states, such as diplomacy and conditionality, to influence domestic politics in states with sizable ethnic minorities. Research traditionally focuses on three factors to explain states' minority policies: the ethnic minority, the ethnic majority and the homeland. I take a new approach by examining the role of international actors. In doing so, I return to a central question in political science, namely: when and why do states comply with international laws and norms? Scholars have proposed two competing answers to the "why" of the compliance puzzle---one rationalist, the other constructivist. However, from a policy-driven perspective, another important issue is not whether actors change their beliefs, but what their actions are. What behavior by international actors most effectively solicit a domestic response compatible with international norms? Given that the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the EU have all made concerted efforts to influence domestic policies on ethnic minorities, I examine why their influence on behavior has varied so substantially.; These institutions have basically used two tools to address ethnic minority-related issues in Europe: normative pressure and membership conditionality. I analyze these two behaviors using literatures on socialization and conditionality. Using quantitative and qualitative methods I explore the legislation on ethnic minorities adopted by the Slovak, Romanian, Latvian and Estonian parliaments in 1990--99. I also consider how domestic actors---nationalist parties, ethnic minorities in parliament, and particularly dominant political leaders---condition the efficacy of international institutions.; I find that socialization alone---while practiced often by the institutions---rarely changes policy. Institutions need to link behavior with other incentives beyond moral recognition. This speaks strongly to the importance of the rationalist motivation behind state actions. Further, institutions can maximize their influence by using incremental membership commitments. Finally, the study finds that membership conditionality can cause change although ethnic issues often are very contentious domestically. In several cases politicians made surprising concessions regarding ethnic minority issues in order to secure more rapid institutional integration into Europe.