| The widespread preservation of inefficient institutions in the post-Soviet environment is one of the biggest unexplained puzzles of transition. This study attempts to unravel the puzzle of the longevity of these institutions using the example of collective agricultural production in Russia. Political and economic incentives for preserving the status quo vs. going through market-oriented transformations are traced to the main actors in agricultural production and distribution, from the oblast administration to enterprise managers and down to employees of collective farms. Institutional mechanisms for preserving a path-dependent Soviet-type redistribution of resources are discussed, along with the benefits that accrue to stakeholders from the preservation of access-based structures modeled after socialist prototypes. The study further examines the divergent dynamics of sub-national agricultural policies that lead to two different oblast-specific patterns of restructuring: a laissez-faire pattern in one oblast and an interventionist pattern in the other. Empirically, the study analyzes financial and production firm level data of collective agricultural producers in two oblasts along with household level surveys of their employees/shareholders, and tests for differences in household level responses to oblast-specific agricultural policies. The study concludes with a discussion of policy implications of the observed patterns. |
