| High-risk states---states that are culturally fragmented, politically unstable, and economically backward---suffer an "insecurity dilemma." Because of their deficiencies, they lack the power to respond to domestic and international crises in a peaceful manner. Their only recourse is violence in the form of state repression and international conflict.; Surprisingly, however, statistical analyses reveal that these states resort to international violence less frequently than any other type of state. They do not engage in interstate war, and they do not escalate disputes with other states to the level of violence. Instead, in response to threats, high-risk state leaders almost invariably respond with repression.; This result is important for understanding global violence in the coming years because the number of high-risk states is on the rise. Using a combined research strategy of formal modeling, multinomial logistic regression and spatial analytic techniques, I investigate the dynamics of violent behavior by high-risk states and compare their use of violence to that of established states.; The results indicate that the greatest threats to high-risk states are internal. Leaders in these states direct their aggression at domestic challengers because they have little to fear from external actors. Norms of non-intervention and juridical sovereignty have reduced the relevance of "self-help" strategies of state survival. There are few credible threats from the outside world; leaders in high-risk states do not need to fear the loss of their territory or legal status. As a result, repressing those who might challenge the persistence of a winning coalition becomes the central strategy for the ruling regime's survival.; The most important issue raised in this research may be that external challenges are not considered threatening by high-risk states. This result contradicts much of the conventional wisdom of international affairs, and begs the question of whether the international system is changing. There are two important implications: first, the most important forms of conflict in the coming years are likely to be intrastate, not interstate; and, second, in order to interpret and forecast conflict processes, attention must shift from the dynamics of the system to the dynamics of the state. |
