| Since the end of WWII, the liberal trade regime has seen an unprecedented rate of expansion and growth. Trade between the U.S.A. and its largest trading partners has been at the forefront of this expansion. With this growth in trade has come changes in the nature of trade disputes. This growth and change, though, has resulted in a system of dispute resolution that varies among the U.S.A.'s trade partners through governmental behavior in the resolution of these disputes.; The evolution of trade dispute behavior is evident in the U.S.A.'s use of both domestic and international trade dispute mechanisms, specifically anti-dumping, countervailing duty, Section 301, GATT, and the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement mechanisms. This study examines variance in the U.S.A.'s use of these trade dispute mechanisms with Canada, the European Union, and Japan from 1979--1994 using cross-sectional data and statistical analysis.; This study finds that the "target country" argument, developed herein, explains U.S. trade dispute behavior. The "target country" argument posits that the use of specific trade dispute mechanisms and the degree of conflict escalation is dependent upon the past relationship with that specific trade partner. Put most simply, the U.S.A.'s use of trade dispute mechanisms varies with the trade dispute partner and the information gathered in each dispute is context specific. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is found that variance in trade dispute resolution is not explained solely by either interdependence or to domestic interest groups. |
