International narcotics control and two-level games: Cooperation between the United States and Mexico and Colombia, 1989--2000

I examine how the United States handles narcotics control in its bilateral relationships with Mexico and Colombia during the presidential administration of George H. W. Bush and both William J. Clinton administrations. Working out of the two-level games research tradition in international relations and comparative politics, I seek to explain differences in cooperation across countries and across time by examining the interaction of domestic and international political processes. In so doing, I contribute to the growing literature on this interaction as well as add theoretical and empirical rigor to the narcotics policy literature. Cooperation, conceptualized in terms of policy adjustments, serves as the dependent variable. I test three hypotheses consistent with the two-level games approach: strength of the president, timing of elections, and executive-legislative relations. I also address two alternative hypotheses which are not consistent with the two-level games literature: the interdependent U.S.-Mexican relationship and the reputation of the Colombian president and probe their impact on narcotics control cooperation. My findings indicate that of the variables consistent with the theoretical model, electoral tests and executive-legislative relations most affect cooperation between the United States and Mexico and Colombia. However, the alternative hypotheses consistently exhibit strong explanatory power. Together, this suggests that while the interaction of domestic and international political processes often has strong explanatory power, it does not explain everything. This suggests important limitations to the theoretical framework and important avenues for further reflection and research.